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Abstract
When a Decision Maker is asked to provide his or her preferences, the response
represents a snapshot in time. While their preference structure elicited at any given
moment represents their revealed preferences at that point in time, it may change over
time. These changing preferences over time represent ambiguity in the decision maker’s
preferences. Other sources of ambiguity may result from the presence of groups in the
decision making process.
One weakness of many decision analysis techniques today is the inability to
incorporate this possible ambiguity into the basic decision model. The existence of the
problem has been known and commented on for many years. This research attempts to
address that problem. It begins with the basic approach and methodology developed by
Ralph Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking (VFT). This methodology is then expanded to
allow decision makers to specify not just constant weights to demonstrate their
preferences, but an entire distribution. These distributions are then incorporated with the
value of the attributes and the whole is simulated using Monte Carlo Simulation provided
by Crystal Ball.
The result of incorporating these weight distributions into the model, is an
empirical distribution for the value of an alternative. The alternative distributions can be
compared in a number of ways to provide insight to the decision maker.

ix

VALUE FOCUSED THINKING IN THE PRESENCE OF WEIGHT
AMBIGUITY: A SOLUTION TECHNIQUE USING MONTE CARLO
SIMULATION

1. Introduction

Countless decisions are made every day by people all across the world. Some of
these decisions are made as a rapid response to immediate events allowing little or no
time for analysis. Others are researched at length and made only after exhaustive study
and debate. Whether made in the spur of the moment or after years of analysis, these
decisions encompass a myriad of outcomes and consequences.
Throughout history, people have been making decisions. For almost every
complex decision made, someone else is trying to help, guide or influence the decision
and the decision maker. This aid comes from all areas of life. Religion, ethics, morality,
science, politics, force and philosophy are only a few of the schools of thought that have
attempted to guide the world in its decision making. While these sources may all provide
good guidelines, their general rules and guiding principles do not provide insight into
every decision situation. The growing complexity of our world has made it necessary to
address our decision making from a more precise, organized and analytical perspective
(Kaufman, 1968: 13).
In any decision, the Decision Maker (DM) must choose between at least two
alternatives. For most of human history, the decisions facing mankind have been made
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largely through intuition (Kaufman, 1968: 12). Decision Analysis (DA) seeks to aid the
DM through structuring the decision problem clearly and choosing among competing
alternatives (Howard, 1968b: 581-582).

1.1 Background

Even among the more analytical approaches to decision making, there are many
possible techniques. Social and cognitive psychology offer an entire body of knowledge
to the science of human decision making. Psychological research into social and
cognitive processes may involve analyzing the specific mechanics used by the human
brain in making a decision or what aspects of a person’s life is most influential in shaping
their decisions. Economics also provides techniques for making decisions involving
fiscal or monetary situations. Operations research (OR) is another science involved in the
pursuit of better decision making (Howard and Matheson, 1968: 21-26). Compared to
psychology and economics, OR is a relatively new discipline which brings its own suite
of tools and techniques to address decision making. Mathematical programming has
been used to aid decision making involving optimizing some value in the face of
constraints. Game theory addresses decisions made against direct opposition from some
other person(s) or situation(s). Decision analysis seeks to provide insight into a decision
based on the information available about the situation, the potential alternatives and the
preferences and attitudes of the decision maker (Bunn, 1984: 1-8; Clemen, 1999: 5-8).
Decision Analysis provides the larger canvas for the research in this thesis.
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Decision analysis is concerned with identifying the logical and reasonable
conclusions based on the problem structure, the alternatives, and decision maker
preferences (Howard, 1983: 7). Decision analysis seeks to assist in making some
impending decision. Through interaction with the appropriate decision makers, analysts
and subject matter experts, DA attempts to accurately structure that decision and identify
the relevant pieces.
Decision analysis has been applied to a number of decision problems in public
policy, corporate decision making and personal choices (Keeney and McDaniels, 1999:
651; Keeney, 1992: 342, 372). The methods used to analyze decision situations in all
areas come in many forms and focus on different aspects of the situation. The method
employed and the factors under consideration are a direct result of the decision situation
itself. Some methods address decision making with a single objective (maximizing
expected profit for example) (Clemen, 1996: 19-21), while others concentrate on
structuring problems where many diverse and often conflicting objectives are present
(Keeney and McDaniels, 1999: 655). Decision analysis models can address problems
with sequential decisions or when only a single decision needs to be made. These
problems can include deterministic frameworks where all relevant parameters are
assumed to be known (Keeney and McDaniels, 1999: 656-8) or can incorporate a number
of uncertain events and variability in the outcomes. Finally, the goal of decision analysis
is to provide insight into the decision being made and to provide some measure of or
insight into the ranking of the competing alternatives.
Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) is one methodology designed to achieve the goal
of providing insight to the decision maker. VFT was formalized by Ralph Keeney in his
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1992 book Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking (Keeney, 1992)
with the idea that values should be emphasized over alternatives. This approach seeks to
identify the inherent values of the decision maker and the underlying structure of the
decision to choose between competing alternatives or to even help identify new ones.
Quantifying the relative importance of the various and often competing objectives in a
VFT problem may be non-trivial. This relative importance is modeled in VFT as weights
on the various attributes. The essence of these weights is in “value tradeoffs” (Keeney
and Raiffa, 1976: 66). The decision maker must decide how much of attribute A he or
she is willing to give up to get a certain increase in attribute B. These weights come
directly from the decision maker and can be elicited in a number of ways. The methods
for developing weights can impact their final values (Bottomley and Doyle, 2001 and
Poyhonen and Hamalainen, 2001). Just as the elicitation varies, so do the exact
interpretation of these weights (Choo, Schoner and Wedley, 1999). Despite the varied
approaches to weight elicitation and the many interpretations of the weights themselves,
none of these methods are designed to account for ambiguity. They all conform to the
fundamental assumption that the weights can be determined absolutely and do not
change.
VFT and many other decision analysis methodologies do, however, provide for
the possibility that there may be some uncertainty in the performance of the alternatives
on the measurement criteria. One source of uncertainty in alternative performance is a
lack of information. The DM may not have all of the needed details to evaluate the
performance of an alternative. A second source of uncertainty comes from evaluating a
previously untried alternative whose performance can only be estimated ahead of time.
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Regardless of the source, the presence of this ambiguity is a widely accepted
circumstance (Clemen, 1996; Beauregard, 2001). Chapter 2 discusses how this
ambiguity can be incorporated into a decision problem structure and eventually used to
provide insight for the decision maker. One possible method for addressing this
ambiguity is through the use of Monte Carlo simulation (Clemen, 1996: 413).
In 1964, J. M. Hammersley and D. C. Handscomb wrote Monte Carlo Methods in
which they stated, “Monte Carlo methods comprise that branch of experimental
mathematics which is concerned with experiments on random numbers,” (Hammersly
and Handscomb, 1964: 2). This is often useful when only a small amount of real data can
be obtained or the analytical solution is extremely difficult to derive or is intractable. In
the DA context, if the ambiguity in some of the model parameters can be described
through some set of random numbers or an underlying distribution, Monte Carlo methods
can be used to develop probability distributions of the final value for each alternative
(Clemen, 1996; Chacko, 1991).

1.2 Problem Statement

Decision analysis models, in their basic philosophy and structure, often assume a
single DM (Buchanan, 2001; Howard, 1980: 198). Another assumption is that the
weights or preference structure of the decision maker can be determined absolutely and
without variation (Kassouf, 1965: 8; Lavelle et al., 1997: 769; Shepetukha et al.,
2001:229). As mentioned in the previous section, VFT assumes that the weights used in
the model are known and unchanging. In many situations, this assumption may not be
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valid. The potential for a violation of this assumption is well known giving rise to the
idea of sensitivity analysis (Winston, 1994). That is, analyzing the model to see if it is
robust to changes in a given parameter. This is often a post hoc process accomplished
after the primary analysis and not affecting the underlying structure of the decision (Felli
and Hazen, 1999: 79). However, if the preference weighting is known to be ambiguous,
it may be more accurately represented as a distribution and incorporated into the basic
model as such. Chapter 2 explores, in more detail, when this situation might occur.
Furthermore, a disconnect has developed between the underlying theory of VFT
and its actual application. VFT is often used to address problems faced by groups
(Keeney and McDaniels, 1999). Unless a consensus in preferences is reached with
certainty, some variability underlies the weighting. Even when dealing with a single
decision maker, ambiguity concerning the DM’s preference structure may exist
(Moshkovich et al., 2002). A DM’s preferences may change over time, inducing
variability into a decision structure meant to be robust against the timing of the decision
(Fishburn, 1964: 20-21). An ambiguous preference structure may also be created through
the existence of uncertainty or variability. Further, a decision maker may not have a
complete understanding of his or her own preference (Fishburn 1964: 20-21, 84). This
ambiguity on the part of the DM may adversely affect the outcome of the model if
certainty is incorrectly assumed. A methodology designed to incorporate this ambiguity,
regardless of the source, will allow greater flexibility in the possible structure of decision
problems.
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1.3 Research Direction

The research in this thesis demonstrates a process for incorporating weight
ambiguity into VFT models. Through the use of Monte Carlo simulation, ambiguity can
be modeled and the resulting decision problem analyzed empirically. A review of the
current literature and practices provides the framework for the issues involved and
establishes the premise for the need for this new technique.

1.3.1 Objectives.

Having identified a potential need for including weight ambiguity into the
structure of a DA problem, this research has two objectives: develop a solution
methodology and provide concrete examples of this methodology. First, this research
develops and describes a methodology for incorporating weight ambiguity into the VFT
framework. This methodology includes the use of Monte Carlo simulation to construct
an empirical distribution of values for each alternative. These distributions can then be
evaluated to determine the preferred alternative. Second, this methodology will be
demonstrated through the use of two concrete examples. The first example is from a
1997 study attempting to develop an analytical solution to a problem of weight ambiguity
(Lavelle et al., 1997). The second example will come from the Information Assurance
decision problem found in Lt Beauregard’s thesis (Beauregard, 2001).
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1.3.2 Approach

This study relies heavily on a literature search of decision analysis and decision
making under ambiguity. Synthesizing this literature provides a map through the last half
century of the discipline. During this time, the importance, use and elicitation of weights
has gone through many phases. At times they have been thought of as merely “scaling
constants” used to try to equate fundamentally different aspects of a decision problem;
for example, how does a DM equate an increase of one mile per gallon of gas mileage to
increasing a vehicle color from his or her second favorite to most favorite (Keeney,
1992). At other times, weights have very specifically been labeled as the decision
maker’s specific relative preference among the competing objectives (Beroggi 1999).
Once the literature search has firmly established both a need and a possible
avenue to fulfill this need, the methodology being proposed is described. The
methodology presented in this thesis mirrors VFT up to the elicitation of weights. At this
point, the discussion departs into Monte Carlo simulation. This approach also
necessitates a new method for evaluating which alternative is “best.” While a number of
possible techniques for comparing alternatives are presented, it is not the focus of this
research to determine which of these, or some other technique not described, is of most
use to the decision maker. The previously mentioned examples (Lavelle and Beauregard)
have been chosen to demonstrate two things. The first example (described in detail in
Chapter 2) compares analytical and simulation results for a given problem structure to
establish the methodology presented as a valid and applicable approach to dealing with
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the existence of weight ambiguity in a VFT framework. The second example (also
described in Chapter 2) demonstrates the applicability and use of the methodology on a
more complex decision hierarchy.

1.3.3 Scope and Assumptions

This research is not without its own assumptions and limitations. The literature
search encompasses a lengthy discussion on the interpretation and elicitation of weights.
The research does not, however advocate any given interpretation or go into any
discussion of their relative merits. For more in depth comparisons and discussions of
elicitation techniques, the 1999 study by Choo, Schoner and Wedley provides a survey of
techniques that have been used (Choo et al., 1999). It is not the intention of the author, or
the point of this research, to enter into the debate on preferred interpretations or
elicitation methods.
Similarly, this thesis does not discuss or evaluate the methods for eliciting
subjective probabilities from a decision maker. Other researches have explored this area
and developed a number of techniques and approaches (Benson et al., 1995; Kahn and
Meyer, 1991). This research assumes that these approaches are appropriate and sufficient
to address the issues of weight ambiguity as used here.
Finally, this thesis is concerned with the VFT hierarchical structure and adapting
that structure to accommodate a new dimension of ambiguity. This method uses the
weighted, additive value model and its underlying assumptions. It does not include any
process or guidelines for any other aggregation rules. While the basic approach
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developed here may be appropriate for other multi-attribute decision analysis
methodologies or systems, the author makes no claims to applicability outside of VFT.
Expanding this approach beyond VFT, is an issue for future research.

1.4 Research Contribution

The techniques presented in this thesis represent a basic adaptation of a familiar
method for analyzing multi-attribute decision problems. Through an expansion of weight
elicitation methods already in practice, weight distributions can be assessed from the
decision maker to correspond with the problem attributes. The presence of these
distributions increases the complexity of the commonly used multi-attribute value
function presented later in Chapter 2. While both a framework and an analytical solution
technique (Lavelle et al., 1997: 769) have been previously used to resolve very simple
decision structures, it has limited application to more complex decision structures.
Simulation can overcome these limitations in the analytical approach.
The key contributions of this research come from its expanded framework that
allows for ambiguity in the weights and its development of a Monte Carlo Simulation
approach to appropriately evaluate and analyze the value of alternatives in the presence
of this ambiguity

1.5 Thesis Overview

This thesis explores the case in which the weights of a multi-criteria decision
problem cannot absolutely be determined. Because of this ambiguity, at least some of

10

these weights must be specified by a range or distribution. The research uses ValueFocused Thinking to structure the decision, and employs Monte Carlo simulation to
develop empirical distributions for the value of the alternatives.
Chapter 1 presented the background and framework to explain the question at
hand. It also answers the research specific questions of objectives and assumptions.
Chapter 2 expands this background into a literature search. Chapter 2 addresses utility
theory and value preferences, the use of weights, properties of decision makers,
ambiguity, alternative selection, Monte Carlo simulation and an overview of two specific
decision examples that will be used later in the thesis. The methodology presented in
Chapter 3 creates a simulation model for incorporating weight ambiguity in a VFT
problem. The exact methodology used, and the resulting simulation, depends on which
of the three separate weighting techniques presented is employed. Examples are
presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 ends the thesis with summaries of the issues, the
proposed technique and the examples. It also discusses some of the limitations of the
research and ends with the final conclusions.
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2. Literature Review

This chapter provides a review of the literature that is key to establishing the
framework that is the basis for this research. This framework begins with a look at the
broad issues and problems addressed by decision analysis. This broad overview is then
narrowed to discuss utility theory, value theory and Value-Focused Thinking (VFT)
specifically. After reviewing these theories and techniques, the chapter specifically
addresses preferences and value tradeoffs a decision maker must identify. Decision
making in the presence of ambiguity is addressed when these preferences and other
model parameters are not exactly known. From this point, the focus shifts to Monte
Carlo techniques and the use of simulation in solving problems that involve probability or
uncertainly. The chapter ends with a discussion of possible formats used to provide
decision makers with insight into the alternatives when ambiguity exists.
Throughout this chapter, several terms are used repeatedly. Some of these terms
are used interchangeably, others are often thought to be interchangeable, but in truth have
different meanings. The first set of definitions to look at involve: attribute, objective and
criterion. These words are often used interchangeably in Decision Analysis literature
(Canada and Sullivan, 1989: 211). However, while similar, their individual meanings are
distinctly different. An attribute is some aspect of a decision that is important to a
decision maker. If purchasing a vehicle, cost may be an important characteristic to
consider. Cost is an attribute in the decision to purchase a vehicle. Objective represents
direction of improvement or preference of the attributes (Canada and Sullivan, 1989:
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211). In the vehicle purchase example, a low cost is the objective. A criterion is a
standard or rule that guides decision making (Canada and Sullivan, 1989: 211). A
criterion relates how much more attractive an option gets as the “level” of an attribute
moves in the direction of the objective. How much better is a car with a cost of $10,000
compared to one with a cost of $15,000? This thesis does not use criterion or objective
interchangeably with attribute, but rather according to their definitions just given. Other
terms with possibly multiple interpretations are also used throughout this thesis. Value
and utility have been mentioned and are addressed specifically in this chapter. As a
central theme of this research, ambiguity, uncertainty and variability are presented and
discussed. These final terms are specifically defined as they appear throughout this
chapter.
To better explain many of the ideas in this chapter, a simple example can often
illustrate a given concept. The notional vehicle example seen in the preceding paragraph
is used in these cases. To provide consistency and context, the decision problem is the
purchase of a new vehicle, with important attributes being cost, functionality and
aesthetic value. The competing objectives are low cost, high functionality and high
aesthetic value.

2.1 Decision Analysis

In 1968, Ron Howard stated, “Decision analysis has emerged from theory to
practice to form a discipline for balancing the many factors that bear upon a decision,”
(1968b: 1). Now, over 35 years later, the practice and application of decision analysis
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has grown tremendously (Raiffa, 2002). Decision analysis comprises more than just
theory and application, but an entire philosophy and world view (Howard, 1968b: 1;
Howard, 1980; Raiffa, 2002).
The decision makers faced with these problems must make value judgments, for
without value judgments, there can be no decision (Howard, 1968a; Keeney, 2002).
Value judgments are necessary to identify appropriate value trade-offs (Keeney, 2002:
936). In this respect, a good value trade-off is one that accurately represents a decision
maker’s values concerning a decision. These value trade-offs, and the underlying value
judgments, drive the decision process as the true basis for comparing alternatives
(Keeney and Raiffa, 1976: 66-69). Alternatives are ultimately the cause for a decision in
the first place. Without at least two alternatives, the course of action is simple, and no
real decision is required; one simply follows the course of action available. Competing
alternatives most often involve more than one attribute. The decision maker’s objectives
for these attributes are often in conflict (Watson and Buede, 1987: 19). That is, to
increase the desirability of an alternative in one attribute will often require lowering the
desirability in another. This situation is most clearly seen when discussing the cost of an
item. Generally, higher quality and functionality and lower cost are competing
objectives. It is the competing nature of objectives that often makes it difficult to choose
among alternatives.
Decision analysis separates a decision into its component pieces to better provide
for a rational decision. A rational decision is one that is logically consistent. A rational
decision maker is one whose decisions flow logically from a set of given values and
preferences (Howard, 1980: 181-182; Kassouf, 1970: 1-8). Decision analysis is, by
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nature, a normative process, that is it seeks to dictate how decisions should be made
rather than describing how they are being made (Howard, 1980: 181; Kassouf, 1970: 14). One question then becomes, why do we need to tell a decision maker what should be
done if he or she makes rational decisions? Unfortunately, most decision makers are not
rational when presented with new problems (Howard, 1980: 181). It is the ability of
decision analysis to assume rationality and then express how a decision should be made
(to maintain that rationality) which is its true “power” (Howard, 1980: 181). By
following the actions prescribed through decision analysis, it is possible to improve on
our natural decision making abilities and make better decisions (Howard, 1980: 181-186;
Kassouf, 1970: 1-4).

2.1.1 Utility

One very common normative approach to decision analysis is utility theory.
Watson and Buede provide a basic definition of utility theory as:
The concept of a numerical measure to describe the value of alternative
choices has come to be referred to as utility theory, with the utility function
being the numerical measure itself. (1987: 21)
“Alternative choices” broadly refers to any possible outcomes or consequences resulting
from some decision. For any two possible outcomes (x1 and x2), a number [u(x1) and
u(x2)] can be assigned to each outcome such that x1 is preferred over x2 if and only if u(x1)
is greater u(x2):
x1 f x2 ⇔ u ( x1 ) > u ( x2 )
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where f means “is preferred to” and the numbers assigned [u(x1) and u(x2)] represent the
utility of x1 and x2 respectively (Fishburn, 1970: 9).
What the definition at the beginning of the preceding paragraph does not explain
is that utility theory is concerned with the uncertainty in a decision problem. More
specifically, it addresses the uncertainty associated with the possible outcomes of a
decision. In the impending vehicle purchase, the exact cost of any given alternative may
not be known exactly. The cost may fluctuate based on the day of purchase, the sales
person available or the negotiating skills of the decision maker. The outcome is
uncertain. It is very important at this point to emphasize this use of uncertainty. Utility
theory addresses the decision maker’s reaction to uncertainty in outcomes, not
preferences (Kahn and Meyer, 1991). The decision maker’s reactions, or attitudes,
towards uncertainty in outcomes are characterized by his or her risk preference, that is,
whether he or she is risk seeking, risk averse or risk neutral (Watson and Buede, 1987:
21; Kassouf, 1970: 36).
The decision maker’s risk preference can be described through the use of a utility
function (Watson and Buede, 1987: 21). The relationship between preference and the
utility function is similar to the utility/preference relationship described at the beginning
of this section. There exists a real valued function, u ( ) , such that for every possible
outcome, x, in X :
x1 f x2 ⇒ u ( x1 ) > u ( x2 ) . (Fishburn, 1970: 9)

The real valued function, u ( ) , is the utility function for the set, X, of possible outcomes.
To assess the utility function, the decision maker is asked a series of questions about his
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or her preference regarding the uncertain outcomes. The decision maker states his or her
preference between a certain outcome and the uncertain outcome of a lottery. These
lotteries are often in terms of monetary value (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976: 143). The
decision maker can choose a certain amount of money $y or can choose the lottery with a
probability, p, of receiving $s and a probability, (1 – p), of receiving $w. When the
decision maker is indifferent between the certain outcome and the lottery, $y represents
the certainty equivalent (Fishburn, 1970: 117; Howard, 1968b: 584). The utility function
can be identified through assessing the certainty equivalent at several points within the
set of possible outcomes (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976: 204-206). Any of the parameters
($y, $s, $w and p) involved in the determination of a certainty equivalent can be varied to
identify the point of indifference. Which parameters to vary, the exact structure of the
lottery and the way in which the questions are posed to the decision maker are all
dependent on the decision maker, analyst, and the current decision situation (Bunn, 1984:
32-33; Clemen, 1996: 469-480; Fishburn, 1970: 117-119; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976: 142208). The expected value of this utility function is known as the expected utility of the
possible outcomes.
In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli wrote, “…the value of an item must not be based on its
price, but rather on the utility it yields. …the utility…is dependent on the particular
circumstances of the person making the estimate,” (Bernoulli, 1954: 24). He was writing
about how to reconcile the apparent inconsistency in how people value money (Watson
and Buede, 1987: 19-21). Utility has since been used to help describe economic behavior
and ethics. Keeney and Raiffa declared that von Neumann and Morgenstern created the
axioms and foundations for the utility theory used widely in decision analysis (Keeney
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and Raiffa, 1976: 131, 283). Since then, others have built on their work, with significant
accomplishment in the field by Peter Fishburn (Fishburn, 1970) and later by Ralph
Keeney and Howard Raiffa (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) (Watson and Buede, 1987: 21).
Although this thesis is chiefly centered around work on value models, a general
understanding of utility theory will help in understanding the discussion on ambiguity
later in this chapter.

2.1.2 Value

In 1987, Watson and Buede made a very clear distinction between value and risk
preferences (21). The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions discussed in the
previous section are used in cases of uncertainty and represent the decision maker’s risk
preferences (Watson and Buede. 1987: 21). Value is a measure of worth to a decision
maker. Value judgments, preference structures and value tradeoffs from the decision
maker all contribute to value as a measure of worth (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976: 66) Value
measures the worth of a outcome to a decision maker regardless of the probability that
the outcome will be realized. That is, value is not concerned with uncertainty, but simply
the preferences of the decision maker (Watson and Buede, 1987: 21).
In Decisions with Multiple Objectives Ralph Keeney and Howard Raiffa make a
“digression” to draw a clear difference between utility functions as created by von
Neumann and Morgenstern and the utility function often used by an economist.
Specifically, Keeney and Raiffa discuss decreasing marginal utility and explain that
because this has no probabilistic aspects any expected utility calculated from the
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decreasing marginal utility curves is useless because “expected utiles” has no real
meaning (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976: 150). They further describe exactly what is meant by
a decreasing marginal utility function:
As an example of our economist’s utility function with decreasing
marginal utility, suppose we considered 8 utiles as the utility of one day of
skiing, 14 utiles for two days, 18 utiles for three days, and so on. Then we
could say the first day is worth 8 utiles, the second an additional 6, and the
third another 4. The marginal utility of each additional day of skiing is
decreasing. However, if we had a choice between two days of skiing for
sure or a lottery yielding either one or three days with equal likelihood, we
could not say which option should be preferred using the utility function.
This is so even though the expected number of utiles is 13, whereas it is 14
for the sure two days skiing. The concept of “expected utiles” has no
meaning. (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976: 150)
In this example, Keeney and Raiffa explain how the absence of uncertainty in the
decreasing marginal utility function prevents it from having any true meaning as a von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. This example, for the same reason, is excellent
in describing the difference between a value function and a utility function. Further, the
meaning and use of the decreasing marginal utility is a fair analog to the meaning and use
of value. In the example, utiles are measured in whole units and describe worth to the
decision maker. If these units were normalized to sum to 1 (assuming that three days
skiing is the maximum possible outcome for this situation), then one day of skiing would
now have a utility of 0.44 (8/18), two days of skiing would have a utility of 0.78 (14/18),
and three days would have a utility of 1 (18/18). However, in the context of decision
analysis as described so far, these are not utilities because, as Keeney and Raiffa
explained in the original example, they do not incorporate any uncertainty. Instead, the
decreasing marginal utility has captured the decision maker’s relative value tradeoffs
among the possible outcomes, i.e. the number of days skiing. The utility represents the
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value of each outcome and the decreasing marginal utility function can be thought of as
the value function. In this case, any alternative that provides all three days of skiing
provides the maximum value (1) for the objective “skiing”. If, however, an alternative
only provides 2 days of skiing, the value for the objective “skiing” for that alternative
would only be 0.78. From this, it is clear that the decision maker’s “utility,” or worth, in
the absence of risk or uncertainty in the outcome is his or her value. Throughout this
thesis, utility is used to represent the decision maker’s preferences in the presence of
uncertainty in the outcomes, i.e. risk preference, and value is used to represent the
decision maker’s preferences when there is no uncertainty in the outcomes of an
alternative.
The research in this thesis is based on the weighted, additive value model in
Equation 1:

V j = ∑ wi vi ( xij )
k

i =1

∀j = 1K p

where:

V j ≡ the overall value of alternative j
wi ≡ the weight of measure i
vi ≡ the single dimension value function for measure i
xij ≡ the score of alternative j on measure i
k ≡ the total number of measures
p ≡ the total number of alternatives
In this equation, the value of an alternative is the weighted sum of the values obtained
from the measures created for each alternative. The processes for developing this
equation are presented in section 2.2.

20

(1)

2.2 Value-Focused Thinking (VFT)

Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) was formalized by Ralph Keeney and presented
in his book Value-Focused Thinking, A Path to Creative Decision Making (Keeney,
1992). VFT is a hierarchically structured, multi-attribute decision analysis methodology
that emphasizes value over alternatives. Many decision methods focus quite heavily on
the alternative solutions available for a given decision (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Olson
et al., 1999). This does not seem abnormal when one considers that, “decision making
usually focuses on the choice among alternatives,” (Keeney, 1992: 3). Instead, VFT
structures the decision problem based on the decision maker’s values. Ralph Keeney
wrote, “Values are what we care about,” and then, “Values are more fundamental to a
decision problem than are alternatives,” (1992: 3). In this respect, VFT is more than a
specific methodology. It is a philosophy as well as a general approach to the science of
decision making and the process of providing insight to the decision maker.
“Values of decisionmakers are made explicit with objectives,” (Keeney, 1992:
33). A fundamental objective provides the decision context, the value involved and the
direction of preference (Keeney, 1992: 34). Values can be further refined to means
objectives. Means objectives represent the specific means by which the fundamental
objectives can be achieved (Keeney, 1992: 34-35). The degree to which these means
objectives are achieved is determined using a measure or measurement scale. Please note
that while a measurement scale is used to define an attribute (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976:
32; Kirkwood, 1997: 12) it is also used in a broader sense in the general literature (and as
noted at the beginning of this chapter) to indicate all of the “factors of importance”
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involved in a decision problem (Lavelle et al., 1997: 769). In the VFT context, the
“factors of importance” are the decision maker’s values. To continue with this broader
usage, this thesis refers to values, fundamental objectives and means objectives
collectively and alternatively as attributes.
As a multi-attribute technique, VFT breaks the decision problem into its
component pieces based on the values of the decision maker. The vehicle example
already introduced in this chapter is an example of a multi-attribute problem. The
decision context is the purchase of a new vehicle. The DM’s values in the purchase of a
new vehicle guides the VFT process. These values are structured into a hierarchical form
(Kim and Han, 2000: 79). This form is also referred to as a hierarchical attribute tree, a
hierarchical value tree or a value hierarchy (Keeney, 1992; Kim and Han, 2000: 79;
Poyhonen, 1998: 7). Figure 1 provides an example of a value hierarchy:
Purchasing a Vehicle

Cost

Functionality

Aesthetics

Figure 1: Notional Value Hierarchy for a Vehicle Purchase

In Figure 1, “Purchasing a Vehicle,” is the decision of interest. For this decision, the DM
values cost, functionality and aesthetics.
VFT, as originally presented by Ralph Keeney, is designed to deal with
uncertainty and is rooted in utility theory (Keeney, 1992: 129-141). The mathematical
underpinnings of VFT are in development and use of utility functions (Keeney, 1992:
129-154). Keeney refers to the resultant models as value models (Keeney, 1992: 129132). Why use utility functions to develop a value model? Keeney provides three
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reasons. First, the use of utility functions allows him to address the presence of
uncertainty and risk. Measurable value functions do not address risk attitudes. Second,
concentrating on utility functions allows for a more concise discussion. Finally, “the
concepts and procedures for utility functions and measurable value functions are
analogous,” (Keeney, 1992: 132) Why a value model instead of a utility model? Utility
functions are created using the decision maker’s value trade-offs (which, in turn, came
from the DM’s value judgments) (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976: 220-222). As mentioned
earlier in this section, VFT is more than just a methodology, it is a philosophy for
approaching decisions. In cases with no uncertainty, the value principles discussed in
section 2.1.2 apply.
The general VFT methodology and philosophy can be applied to value models as
well as utility models. In cases where the value adapted VFT methodology is used, the
general process follows along the following lines. 1) Identify and structure the objectives
and criteria important to a decision maker for the decision situation at hand (Keeney,
1992: 55-98). This structure often takes the form of an objectives hierarchy that
continues to break down the component parts of an objective until a final end measure
can be found. 2) Develop measurement scales for each of the final end measures
identified in step 1 (Keeney, 1992: 3) These measures, which are often composed of
scales with different units and vastly different ranges, are assigned a value according to
some function: vi = f ( xi ) , ∀i = 1K k where xi is the resulting score of some alternative
on the measure associated with a single attribute i, and f ( xi ) is a monotonically
increasing or decreasing function whose range is between zero and one (Kirkwood,
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1997). These functions, known as Single Dimension Value Functions (SDVF), are
created for all k measures. This mapping translates scores from measures into value. The
value is measured from 0 to 1 with higher value being more preferred. 4) Weight the
competing objectives based on the preferences of the decision maker. 5) Score each of
the identified alternatives on the measurement scales and convert them to values. 6)
Aggregate the weighted values from each of the lowest level attributes and determine
final values for the alternatives. 7) Rank these alternatives and provide insight to the
decision maker.
A decision analysts greatest value to the decision maker is in the ability to
properly structure a decision situation (Howard, 1986b: 2). By focusing on values rather
than alternatives (Keeney, 1992: 3) the analyst is able to accomplish this regardless of the
current set of alternatives. A properly structured value model from the decision maker
can be used not only to rank existing alternatives, but also identify shortfalls and
strengths in these alternatives based on the objectives and preferences of the decision
maker (Keeney, 1992: 9). If these alternatives are unsatisfactory as a whole, the structure
can be used to develop potentially better alternatives. Emphasis on values and the given
stepwise procedure has also been applied using value functions rather than the utility
functions provided in the original VFT framework but is still generally referred to as
Value-Focused Thinking (Beauregard, 2001).
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2.3 Weights

This section focuses on that portion of VFT concerned with a decision maker’s
preferences and value trade-offs. These preferences and value trade-offs are represented
as weights in a value model. If the weight for a given objective is higher than the weight
of another, that objective is considered to be more important to the decision being made
based on the decision makers values and preference. The potential interpretation and
elicitation of these weights is quite diverse and has an impact on how the problem is
structure and the insight provided (Choo et al., 1999; Poyhonen, 1998). Some of these
interpretations include the marginal contribution per unit of the objective in question,
discriminating power of the objectives, voting values, relative functional importance and
others (Choo et al., 1999).
Regardless of their interpretation, value trade-offs must be tied to the range of the
raw scores for the measures to which they are linked (Keeney, 2002: 940-941). This can
be illustrated with the vehicle example. In the vehicle example, cost may be considered
in general more important than aesthetics by the decision maker and one may expect to
see cost weighted higher than aesthetics. However, if the range in the cost of each of the
competing alternatives is quite small, the decision maker may feel that the difference in
value of decreasing cost from its highest to its lowest may not be overall as important as
the change in aesthetics. Of course, exactly what “quite small” entails will be up to the
decision maker. In this case, cost will have a lower weight reflecting the small range
among alternatives and smaller value the decision maker puts on a change of cost within
that range. Misinterpretation of these weights, no matter how they are applied, can often
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lead to incorrect rankings of alternatives and provide faulty insight into the problem
(Choo et al., 1999).
Not only do the weights have potentially differing meanings, but they can be
elicited from the decision maker in a number of ways. These elicitation methods are
inextricably linked to their interpretation. One thing that weight elicitation methods and
interpretations have in common is that they result in constant weights (Choo et al., 1999).
This philosophy of constant weights stems from an early concept that the weights fall into
the category of decision variables and as such can be set to any level by the decision
maker (Spetzler et al., 1972). As described in the Problem Statement in section 1.2,
decision analysis methodologies assume that these weights can be exactly specified by
the decision maker.
Among the various weight elicitation methods used, the exact information
obtained from the decision maker changes. In some cases, the information provided by
the decision maker is not the weights that will be used to solve Equation 1 but rather
other preference structures that can then be used to calculate these weights (Poyhonen
and Hamalainen, 2001: 569-572). Regardless of the method used, it is generally
accepted, to provide consistency in application, that the weights (directly or calculated)
must sum to 1 (Poyhonen and Hamalainen, 2001: 570; Kirkwood, 1997: 70). Whether
weights are elicited directly or are derived from other preference statements, they can be
obtained either locally or globally. A value hierarchy is grouped into tiers. Each tier
represents further breakdown and delineation of the “parent” attributes in the tier above.
Weights can then be elicited based on each tier (hierarchical weighting or local weights).
Weights could also be elicited directly from the lowest level attributes in the hierarchy
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(non-hierarchical weighting or global weights) (Poyhonen, 1998: 8). In the case of
hierarchical weighting, the final weights used in the calculation of Equation 1 are found
by multiplying the local weights to the end of each branch. In non-hierarchical
weighting, the global weights are used directly in the calculation of Equation 1.

2.4 Direct Weighting

Direct weighting involves having the decision maker provide the exact numerical
weight (from zero to one) for each of the attributes in question. This is often
accomplished by telling the decision maker he has 100 points and must allocate all of
them among the objectives. This is also sometimes referred to as the “100 balls” method.
These direct weights can easily be seen as a direct representation of the value of the
attribute relative to the whole (Poyhonen et al., 2001: 571). In the vehicle example, a
decision maker may say that cost is 40 points (40 out of a possible 100 is 40% of the
decision) and therefore has a weight of 0.4. This weight has meaning because we know
that the total sum of the weights must be 1. If the sum of the weights were something
other than 1, 0.4 would no longer mean 40% of the decision (it would not account for 40
points out of 100). The number provided by the decision maker is the percentage of the
decision encompassed in that attribute directly. Furthermore, the information provided
about any given weight offers no direct indication of the weights of the other attributes.
Only through their relationship to the whole (one) can relative proportionality be
determined.
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Direct weighting can be used locally or globally. When used locally, it assesses
value trade-offs within a given branch and tier and assigns some portion of the whole
value to each of them. When used globally, all final branch ends are compared for value
tradeoffs and weights are assigned accordingly.

2.5 Independent Scale Weighting

Another method that has been used is independent scale weighting (Keeney and
McDaniels, 1996; Lavelle et al. 1997). With the independent weighting technique, the
information obtained from the decision maker relates the importance of each attribute to
some independent scale that may or may not be directly related to each attribute.
Whether directly related or not, the same scale is used for all attributes. Some scales that
have been used are money (Keeney and McDaniels, 1996) and simply importance
(Lavelle et al., 1997: 772). In each case, an attribute is given some value along the scale
used. To provide weights that sum to 1, the value of each attribute along the independent
scale is divided by the sum of the values of all of the attributes. This normalization
procedure relates the actual information obtained to the weights used.
In the car example, an independent scale from 1 to 10 might be used to determine
the importance and subsequent weights of the three attributes. The decision maker is
instructed to identify the importance of each attribute on this scale with 10 being very
important to the decision maker and 1 being of very little importance. The decision
maker may decide that cost is very important (assigns a 10), functionality somewhat
important (assigns a 7) and aesthetics of little importance (assigns a 4). The sum of these
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three values is 21. After normalizing, the actual weights would be cost = 10/21 = 0.477,
functionality = 1/3 = 0.333, and aesthetics = 4/21 = 0.190.
Independent scale weighting does not provide a value that is directly relative to
either the whole or among attributes. Knowing that cost gets a 10 in importance on a
scale of 1 to 10 does not tell us how much of the value of the whole decision is captured
in the cost until the values are normalized. There is no direct interpretation of “10” with
respect to the whole decision. Similarly, there is no direct relationship among attributes
by knowing only a single attribute value. Although cost is 10, there is no way to know
how that might compare to other attributes unless their value is known. If the other
attributes each get a 1, then cost is much more important relatively. If, however, the
others are also given a 10, then cost, while important to the decision (as seen by receiving
the highest score on the scale) is no more important than the others. But, in both cases, it
is necessary to have more information than just the value of cost.

2.6 Swing Weighting

Swing weighting is the third method reviewed in this thesis (Kirkwood, 1997;
Keeney, 1992). There are two variants to this method. The first variant is to take each
measure independently and consider what increase in value of the alternative as a whole
would result from swinging that measure from its lowest possible score to its highest.
This is done with all attributes and the resulting increases in value are ordered from least
to greatest. Each increment is then assessed as some multiple of the least important
increment. These values are normalized to provide the weights for the objectives
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(Kirkwood, 1997: 68-72). The second variant involves taking the objectives in pairs (A
or B) and holding all other objectives constant, deciding which of the pair, A for example,
the decision maker would rather swing from its lowest to its highest value. The decision
maker must also provide the strength of this preference (Kirkwood, 1997: 68-72). This is
done with all pair wise comparisons and the results normalized. If inconsistencies exist
in the comparisons, they can be discussed with the decision maker and resolved. This
method obtains information from the decision maker that relates one attribute to another.
While the attribute of lowest importance is generally used as the baseline, this is not
necessary.

2.7 Decision Making in the Presence of Ambiguity

“Most, if not all, decisions are made under uncertainty …” (Wallace, 2000: 20).
The decisions faced by individuals, groups and organizations encompass ambiguity as a
major aspect (Watson and Buede, 1987: 11; Howard, 1983:7). As discussed earlier,
uncertainty is considered in terms of the performance of an alternative or the possibility
of outcomes. This uncertainty can stem from imprecision of measurement or the
uncertainty inherent in trying to predict the future performance of a system not yet in use.
This research, however is chiefly concerned with the situation in which the weights for
the attributes are not known precisely.
At this point, it is important to define three terms: uncertainty, variability, and
ambiguity. Uncertainty is a lack of knowledge about the true state of some quantity
(Frey, 1993: 2). If the true state of some variable is known, but changing according to
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some other variable (often time or individual samples), then that quantity exhibits
variability. In this research, these two aspects of imprecision in information are
collectively referred to as ambiguity. The term ambiguity will be used when it is not
necessary to differentiate the nature of the imprecision, when both types are being
referred to, or when this information may not be known. Uncertainty or variability are
used in those cases in which their specific definitions apply and are relevant. Regardless
of the source or cause, it is very beneficial to have a decision analysis model that can
account for the presence of ambiguity.

2.7.1 Uncertainty in Measures

Uncertainty in the performance of an alternative or the possible outcomes has
been a part of decision analysis models from the very beginning and almost all normative
techniques are designed to account for it. Uncertainty in the performance of alternatives
refers to the incomplete knowledge of how a given alternative will score against some
measure or the natural uncertainty in the performance the alternative will exhibit through
time (Wallace, 2000: 20). This uncertainty can also rise from the uncertainty of the
environment in which the decision will ultimately be made (Clemen, 1996: 2).

2.7.2 Decision Makers

The nature and role of the decision maker can often affect the structure and
technique applied. The most common use of “Decision Maker” or DM in the decision
analysis framework is that of a single decision maker (Buchanan et al., 2001; Lavalle,
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1978). This idea of a single decision maker allows analysts to make simplifying
assumptions in their models by not considering the interaction of the various parties to
the decision and their possibly competing preference structures (Keeney and Raiffa,
1976: 516). However, it is becoming more apparent that many decisions involve not just
a single decision maker, but a group that is responsible for making a decision. Another
interpretation of the “decision maker” involves looking at stakeholder groups (Keeney
and McDaniels, 1999). Even if a single person is responsible for making a decision, that
person must often take into account not only their own preferences, but those of other
stakeholders in the process.
Consensus is often the goal of group decision making (Ellis and Fisher, 1974:
141-143). Coming to an exact consensus through discussion may be a very lengthy and
difficult process and may leave many members in the group feeling as though their views
are not adequately represented (Ellis and Fisher, 1974: 235-246). Another issue involved
when dealing with groups and group consensus is that a group will over time develop its
own distinct identity (Rothwell, 1992: 183-187). This identity and the consensus it forms
may not truly represent the preferences of the individual members.

2.7.3 Weight Ambiguity

Recent trends in decision analysis have pointed out the possible fallacy of
assuming that the weights placed on objects are known with absolute certainty (Kelley
and Thorne, 2001; Levary and Wan, 1998; Kim and Han, 2000; Lavelle et al., 1997;
Stewart, 1995). As a fairly recent relaxation of the assumption that preferences and value
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trade-offs can be exactly determined, there is not yet a lengthy body of literature. There
are several potential sources of ambiguity in objective weights. Even a single decision
maker with plenty of time may not be able to exactly define and articulate his or her
preferences. Researchers in this area have used terms like “partial information” and
“incomplete knowledge” to describe this phenomenon, but regardless of the terminology,
the concept is that the decision maker may not be able to completely resolve the complex
changing environment in which the decision must be made (Kim and Han, 2000).
Far more likely than uncertainty within a single decision maker is the variability
inherent in group processes and multiple stakeholders. The Keeney, McDaniels study for
BC Gas, clearly illustrates the wide range of responses for value tradeoffs from the
various stakeholders (Keeney and McDaniels, 1999). At times the variations involve
differing orders of magnitude. It may be very difficult to represent these ranges as a
single constant value. Possible solutions to this problem have included analytical
solutions using greatly simplified MAVT models (Lavelle et al., 1997) and a simulation
approach based on building a probability of specific alternative rankings used by Kelly
and Thorne (2001). Simulation was also used in conjunction with a descriptive decision
analysis model, AHP, by Levary and Wan (1998). Kim and Han used a recursive
mathematical programming approach to resolve uncertainty (2000).

2.8 Monte Carlo Simulation

Monte Carlo Simulation is a technique used when ambiguity exists in a system to
develop an empirical probability distribution for some measure of the system (Kalos and
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Whitlock, 1986: 129-130). More specifically, it is a numerical technique in which
various input parameters are specified by some probability function. An output measure
defined by some function of these random input variables will itself be a random
variable. While probability theory can possibly provide an analytic solution to this
function of random variables, it may be extremely difficult. In some cases there may not
exist a closed form solution. To account for these difficulties, Monte Carlo techniques
make a random draw from each of the input distributions underlying the model and use
the result in the governing function for a given output variable. This process will provide
one sample point from the distribution of the output variable. When a series of random
draws is conducted many times in an established experimental design, an empirical
distribution of the output variable can be constructed. This empirical distribution can
then be used to address questions about the output variable.
Monte Carlo simulation is a logical alternative to standard expected utility theory
(Clemen, 1996: 410-414). Instead of merely taking the expected utility of an alternative
(in the case of risk preference and uncertainty in outcomes), analysts can use this
technique to construct an empirical distribution of the overall utility of the alternative.
Alternatives can then be ranked or investigated based on their distributions as well as
their expected values. When ambiguity in the weights is present, Monte Carlo simulation
can be used in the same manner it is used in the presence of ambiguity in the outcomes.
Monte Carlo techniques were first used to conduct numerical integration involved
with the development of the atomic bomb (Hammersly and Handscomb, 1964: 6-9). In
this and other deterministic applications, Monte Carlo simulation is used to estimate the
value of integrals and other mathematical problems where no closed form analytical
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solutions exist. In the 1950s, the growing development of operations research provided a
new set of problems that could benefit from repeated sampling (Hammersly and
Handscomb, 1964: 8-9).
Using weight distributions to replace point estimate weights in the weighted,
additive value equation does not over complicate the equation itself. However, it’s the
solution to this equation that requires multiple integration techniques (Lavelle et al.,
1997: 773-779). This integration may, through more complex decision structures,
become quite difficult and unwieldy for practical applications. This problem is
highlighted further when using direct weighting in which the weight distributions are not
independent due to their need to sum to 1. Monte Carlo simulation is useful in those
cases where a problem can be formulated theoretically, but not solved that way
(Hammersly and Handscomb, 1964: 3). Rather than develop the analytical solution from
the value equation which now contains random variables, Monte Carlo simulation is used
to sample from each of those random variables in turn and computes the solution to the
equation. Repeated random draws create an empirical distribution for the final value of
the alternative. This can be used when no analytical solution is possible.
The resulting empirical distribution need not approximate a normal distribution in
order to derive inferences about certain distribution parameters (Davison and Hinkley,
1997: 25). Once an empirical distribution has been created for the final value of each
alternative, they can be compared to determine the most attractive decision to the
decision maker.
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2.9 Selecting Alternatives in the Presence of Ambiguity

When Value-Focused Thinking is used to establish single constant values for
alternatives in question, ranking the alternatives is a fairly straightforward matter.
Human judgment and sensitivity analysis can be used to provide insight into alternatives
whose overall value are relatively close. These alternatives can be evaluated further, but
the results will again be some point estimate of value that can be easily ordered.
Selecting the best alternative is not, however, as simple when the values of the
alternatives are represented by some probability distribution. Chapter 3 will discuss the
use of dominance and statistical tests to help determine which alternatives should be
selected over others. Although they are included, the relative merits of the techniques
used to compare alternatives is not addressed in this thesis.

2.10 Examples

As a new adaptation of VFT and an untested method for employing Monte Carlo
Simulation, it is important to provide some level of justification that the methodology
proposed in this research is appropriate. To this end, two examples are presented. The
first example involves finding a location for a new airport. This first example was used
to incorporate weight ambiguity and proposed an analytical solution techniques to arrive
at distributions of value for each alternative. By simulating this example, a comparison
can be made between the simulated results and the analytical results. This comparison
will show that the simulated results closely approximate the analytical results. The
second example involves selecting computer systems to maximize information assurance.
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This example was chosen to demonstrate the methodology and its results on a more
complex value hierarchy.

2.10.1 Mexico City Airport Citing

This first example illustrates the comparison of results between the analytical and
simulated results. In 1997, the journal Computers and Industrial Engineering published
an article by Lavelle et al., “A Method for the Incorporation of Parametric Uncertainty in
the Weighted Evaluation Multi-attribute Decision Analysis Model.” This article presents
a multi-attribute utility model based on multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) described
by Keeney and Raiffa (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976: 436-472). The Lavelle et al. model is
referred to as the weighted evaluation (WE). The WE model is a simplified adaptation of
the weighted additive model shown in Equation 1. The simplifying assumptions are: a)
attribute independence, b) linear utility functions and c) additivity of multiple attributes
(Lavelle et al., 1997). The assumptions of attribute independence and additivity of
multiple attributes allows the authors to use the additive utility function:

k

Z j = ∑ Wi Rij , ∀j = 1,K , p

(2)

i =1

where Zj = the weighted evaluation of alternative j, Wi = the weight of attribute i, Rij = the
rating of alternative j on attribute i, k = the total number of attributes, and p = the total
number of alternatives (Lavelle et al., 1997). Each of the alternatives is rated on an
independent scale of 0 to 100.
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This WE model is then converted to a probabilistic weighted evaluation (PWE) by
replacing the constants used in the Equation 2 with random variables. Lavelle et al.’s
PWE method uses uniform, triangular and beta distributions to model uncertainty in both
the weights on the attributes and the ratings for each alternative on each attribute. These
distributions are used in calculating the first three central moments of the resulting
distributions for the alternatives. The first central moment, the mean, is analogous to the
point estimate results from the WE model. The second central moment, variance, looks
at the spread of the distribution around this mean. Finally, the third central moment,
skewness, gives a measure of how symmetrical the resulting distributions are. These
three moments are then used to develop a normal approximation for the distribution of
each alternative. The PWE does not ensure that the weights sum to 1.

2.10.2 Information Assurance

The second example used later in chapter 4 is the Information Assurance problem
developed by Lt Joe Beauregard (Beauregard, 2001). Lt Beauregard modeled the effects
on information assurance protection for a given computer security system using the
hierarchy in Figure 2.
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Information Assurance
(IA)

Information and IS Protection
4/7 (0.571)

Detection
2/7 (0.286)

Availability
1/9 (0.064)
Confidentiality
4/9 (0.254)
Integrity
3/9 (0.191)
Compliance
1/9 (0.064)

Reaction
1/7 (0.143)

Timely
10/27 (0.106)

Physical
Internal
1/35 (0.003)

Electronic
Internal
10/35 (0.030)

Respond
6/10 (0.086)

Physical
External
4/35 (0.012)

Electronic
External
20/35 (0.061)

Accountability
15/27 (0.159)

Ability to
Detect Event
5/6 (0.132)

Timely
20/27 (0.064)

Flexible
Deterrence
2/27 (0.006)

Verify
5/27 (0.016)

Restore
3/10 (0.043)

Ability Accurately
Categorize Event
1/6 (0.027)

Flexibility
2/27 (0.021)

Timely
1/4 (0.011)

Accurately
3/4 (0.032)

Adapt/Learn
1/10 (0.014)

Figure 2: Weighted Information Assurance Hierarchy (Beauregard, 2001)

Figure 2 provides the name of each objective and sub-objective. It also includes two
weights. The first weight given is the local weight. These local weights are given as a
fraction based on the swing weight coefficients. The numerator of this fraction is the
swing weight coefficient for the objective or sub-objective in question. The denominator
is the sum of the swing weight coefficients in each branch and tier. The swing weight
coefficients shown (the numerators) are assumed to be uncertain later in this thesis. The
second weight, shown in parentheses, is the calculated global weight. This is the product
of the local weight of the objective or sub-objective in question with the local weight of
each successive parent objective or sub-objective above it.
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This decision problem also included more than one measure for some of the final
sub-objectives. In this research, the weights on those final measures are modeled as the
point estimates given. This research only models ambiguity on the swing weight
coefficients used in the local weights of the objectives and sub-objectives.
This chapter presented the framework for value models, VFT and the existence of
weight ambiguity. It also discussed some of the implications of weight ambiguity and
some possible solution methods. Two examples that will be used in Chapters 3 and 4
were also presented. The proposed methodology using Monte Carlo simulation to
incorporate weight ambiguity in a VFT decision problem is further explained in Chapter
3.
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3. Methodology

The methodology presented in this chapter diverges from Value-Focused
Thinking in the determination of the weights. At this point, VFT dictates that the
decision makers preferences be evaluated in terms of weights on the individual attributes
in the hierarchy. A basic assumption of this research is that the weights elicited are not
constant. It further assumes that a distribution of weights can be developed. While the
exact technique for building the distribution from the decision maker’s preferences is not
considered here, the weight elicitation method itself is important.

3.1 Simulation

For experiments and analysis involving Monte Carlo simulation, certain aspects
must be decided before the simulations can be run. First, the various input distributions
must be determined. Then, the number of replications needed to achieve the desired
research goals must be determined. A random seed is chosen and then random numbers
are then drawn from the input distributions and used in accordance with the underlying
purpose of the simulation. In this research each set of random draws is used to calculate
the weights in Equation 1. The exact mechanics used for designing the simulations in
this research are discussed at length.
Once the model has been built, the number of replications needed must be
decided. Current computing power makes a very large number of runs both inexpensive
and quick. This allows the decision analyst to determine the necessary number of
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replications to achieve a desired power or accepted error without being constrained by
time or money. The equation for finding sample size is based on a specified Type I and
Type II error, or α and β respectively. This allows n to be computed based on desired
power and confidence (Hines and Montgomery, 1990: 299). Equation 3 gives the basic
form of the equation that was used to calculate the number of replications:

(Z
n=

α

+ Zβ
2

)σ
2

2

δ2

(3)

where Zα/2 and Zβ come from the cumulative normal distribution for α/2 and β
respectively, σ2 = the population variance, and δ2 = the target difference being detected.
While the population variance may not be known, it can be estimated. After each
alternative is scored and the single dimension values calculated. Each alternative will
exhibit a variance (possibly 0) in its single dimensional values. This variance acts as an
upper limit on the final variance of the score for the attribute. Using the largest variance
from the group of alternatives can serve as a conservative estimate of the population
variance. The variance of a constant times a random variable is equal to the constant
squared times the variance of the random variable (Freund and Walpole, 1987: 166-167).
The single dimensional value of each attribute acts as the constant and the weight is a
random variable. Since all of these values are less than one, their squares will be less
than the original value. In essence, the single dimensional values (between 0 and 1) serve
to scale down the variance of each weight. When these are aggregated, the sum is
likewise scaled down.
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3.2 Direct Weighting

In the presence of ambiguity, direct weighting can be used to elicit a distribution
or range of possible weights rather than a single constant weight. As was discussed in
Chapter 2, this possibility of eliciting a weight distribution is assumed. The methodology
being proposed addresses how to handle the distributions once they have been obtained.
If this direct weight distribution is used, the weights obtained from the decision maker
must follow a logically consistent meaning. Specifically, any possible weight value in
the provided distributions must actually be possible within the restriction that the weights
sum to 1. If each weight in the specified range of the distribution is not possible, then the
decision maker has said that a given attribute could possibly have a weight that it
logically could not. This is the inevitable problem with combining independently elicited
weight distributions in a fundamentally dependent situation. Each weight must equal one
minus the sum of all the other weights. Three possible approaches to resolving this
problem are proposed in this section: direct sum, filtered sum, and normalization.
Consider an example using the vehicle decision to illustrate this point. A decision
maker weights the hierarchy in the following manner, Cost ~ U(0.0,0.6), Functionality ~
U(0.4,0.6) and Aesthetics ~ U(0.1,0.3). The proposed methodology states that for logical
consistency the decision maker must ensure that the most likely values (or means in the
case of uniform distributions) sum to 1. Were the decision maker confined to provide
only a constant weight, it is assumed that the most likely value would be provided. For
this example, 0.3 + 0.5 + 0.2 = 1, and the test for consistency is passed. The
methodology also proposes that every possible value of each distribution must be
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realizable. It can immediately be seen that not every possible value of cost can be
achieved. If some random draw from the cost distribution equals 0.05, then the sum of
the remaining weights must be 0.95 to have the total weights continue to sum to 1. The
maximum possible values of the remaining two distributions only sum to 0.9. It is clear
that any possible draw of random weights from the provided distributions that sums to 1
will never allow the weight for cost to go below 0.1. Therefore, the provided weights do
not allow for every distribution to be completely sampled and the decision maker must be
re-engaged to provide weight distributions that are more consistent. Once consistency
has been ensured, the method employed must ensure input integrity.
There may be a difference between the decision maker specified weight
distribution, the input distribution, and the actual distribution of the weights used in the
calculations of the final value. This is an extension of the idea just discussed. If the
entire distribution is not sampled, then the actual distribution of the weights used to
calculate the final value is not the distribution specified by the decision maker. It is
possible for the same loss of input distribution integrity to occur even if each distribution
is completely sampled. If this happens, the actual weights used to compute the value of
an alternative differ from the distribution the decision maker decided the weight should
come from. This disconnect creates a disconnect between the decision maker’s true
preferences and the actual numbers used to calculate the value of an alternative.
The vehicle example will continue to be used to illustrate the three techniques for
direct weighting, but with a new set of weight distributions. Since this is a notional
example, n = 1000 was chosen. Figure 3 shows the weight distributions that were chosen
to illustrate the three direct weighting techniques.
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Purchasing a Good Car

Cost
triang(0.25,0.3,0.35)

Utility
triang(0.3,0.5,0.7)

Aesthetics
triang(0.0,0.2,0.4)

Figure 3: Notional Car Example, with weights

For this example, it is not necessary to identify any alternatives or individual
alternative scores. Simply using the weighted hierarchy is sufficient to demonstrate the
problems identified. The resulting value from the single dimension value functions
would only serve to scale the various elements of the final alternative value.
The first method employed was to simply allow the weights to be randomly
generated and summed. This provides a distribution around the final sum as seen in
Figure 4.

Overlay Chart
Airport Siting - Alternative A
.032
Normal Distribution
Mean = 1.0025
Std Dev = 0.1207

.024

.^
.016
O
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0.8000

1.0000

1.2000

1.4000

Figure 4: Direct Weighting, sum of weights
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The result from simulating the weights alone with no single dimensional values
from the attributes is the same as simulating an alternative who scored perfectly on all
measures. The low score on this chart is 0.61. If an alternative were to score perfectly on
all measures, its value should be 1.0, not 0.6. The high for this method was 1.33. Again,
if 1 is a perfect score, it would be impossible for an alternative to score above that.
Allowing for all possible independent random draws, the direct sum technique,
provides results that are inconsistent with reality. It is possible with this technique to
have an alternative score almost perfectly and yet still have a low value simply because
of the choice of weights. This is the least preferred of the three techniques and should not
be used.
The second method for simulating direct weight distributions is to filter out any
random pull that is outside a given band. To demonstrate this technique, [0.99,1.01] was
chosen. One problem of filtering is that it greatly increases the number of replications
needed to get the proper (as calculated with Equation 3) sample size. To demonstrate the
results from filtering, the number of replications was increased to 10,000. However, only
373 trials were accepted by the filter. This is a simple hierarchy. When the problems
become more complex, even fewer replications will randomly fall within the desired
filter. The Figure 5 shows the adjusted value hierarchy for this filtering example.
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Purchasing a Good Car

Cost
triang(0.0,0.4,0.4)

Utility
triang(0.5,0.5,0.9)

Aesthetics
triang(0.1,0.1,0.5)

Figure 5: Filtered Car Value Hierarchy

Closer examination of the weight distributions used show that they meet the range
consistency criteria specified previously in this section, however, they lack input
distribution integrity. Figure 6 shows the decision maker provided weight distribution for
cost as a sloped line representing the triangle distribution specified. It also overlays the
actual empirical distribution that was created by the filter and ultimately used in the
calculation of alternative values.

Overlay Chart
Cost Weight for Filtered Car Example
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Max = 0.4000
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Cost Weight
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0.3000

0.4000

Figure 6: Cost weight for filtered car example

An inspection of Figure 6 shows that the distribution used does not actually equal
the one specified. This problem appears to be mitigated as input distributions become
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less skewed. However, there is no guarantee that a complex decision problem will not
contain some fairly skewed distributions. Figure 7 implies that filtering provides a more
accurate representation of input distributions when weights are more symmetrically
distributed.

Overlay Chart
Cost Weight for Vehicle Example, symmetric weighting
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Figure 7: Cost weight, symmetric weights

Filtering partially alleviates the problem of the sum of the weights differing
greatly from 1.0 by restricting the resulting sum to a narrow interval around 1.0. The cost
of this, however is more replications. In the first filtering example, less than 4% of the
trials were acceptable. As hierarchies become more complex, this percentage may be
even lower. The second problem associated with filtering relates to the integrity of the
input distribution. Although all values of the input distributions are possible, the
resulting form of the distribution after filtering may not be the same as the input.
The final method available is normalization. For this example, the number of
replications was set back to 1000 and the original value hierarchy restored. This method
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simply made a random pull from each specified distribution and normalized to 1. The
first problem with this is that the interpretation of the weights becomes lost. The process
of normalization breaks the connection between the weight and the whole (which should
always be 1). When a decision maker specifies a direct weight range from 0.0 to 0.4, the
resulting random pull should have the interpretation of the original intent. That is, if the
random pulls ends up 0.3, this should be 30% of the final value. Normalizing breaks this.
Now, a random draw of 0.3 for Aesthetics could range from 22.2% (0.3 ÷(0.35 + 0.7 +
0.3)) to 35.3% (0.3 ÷(0.25 + 0.3 + 0.3)). This may not seem critical, after all it is still in
the specified range. However, Figure 8 gives a more glaring example of the problem
with normalization from the same value hierarchy .

Overlay Chart
Cost Weight for Normalized Car Example
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Figure 8: Cost Weight for Normalized Car Example

Normalization solves the biggest problem of the direct sum technique by simply
dividing each attribute weight by the sum of the weights for each random draw. It also
avoids the increase in replications caused by filtering. However, as Figure 8
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demonstrates, this process ultimately allows for weights that the decision maker did not
specify as possible. Normalization can also cause input integrity problems.
This section has demonstrated that while structuring a decision problem with
weight ambiguity by using direct weighting may not be too difficult, the actual simulation
of that results can be problematic. These examples illustrate a number of problems
inherent in each of the proposed techniques. However, if the analyst can afford the time
and resources for more replications and if the decision maker has provided symmetrical
weight distributions, filtering offers the least deviation from the stated constraints of
consistency and integrity.

3.3 Independent Scale Weighting

Since the weights are calculated rather than elicited when using independent scale
weighting and swing weighting, the issues addressed in the previous section do not apply.
The entire distribution will always be sampled and the process of normalization always
ensures that the sum of the calculated weights is 1.
The PWE method as described by Lavelle et al. uses a weighting technique based
on an independent scale. In this case the scale is the importance to the decision maker
and ranges from 0 to 100. Each attribute was independently evaluated against this scale
to develop an importance. These importance weights were normalized to provide a
weight from 0 to 1. The simulation process for this example did not address the
weighting method nor the technique for developing the distributions for the model.
Rather, the simulation process made a random draw from each of the input (independent
scale weighting) distributions. At each set of random draws, the independent weight

50

coefficients were normalized. These normalized weights were used to calculate the final
values found in the final value distributions. This process is illustrated in the first
example in Chapter 4.

3.4 Swing Weighting

As previously noted, swing weighting develops relative relationships between the
attributes. Any method for handling ambiguity must preserve this quality. It is
inconsistent to develop a set of relative multipliers, normalize them into weights, then try
to assess a distribution around these weights. The decision maker has provided his or her
preferences on the attributes relative to other attributes. Trying to then obtain
distributions based on the numerical weights breaks this connection between the weights
of the attributes. Consistent interpretation of uncertain quantities must be maintained. If
one attribute is twice as important as another in the most likely case, all other possible
relationships must be made under the same condition of one attribute relative to another.
To preserve this, the swing weight coefficients are the quantities that are allowed to vary.
When weights are obtained through swing weighting, many of the issues
discussed previously are no longer applicable and some of the difficulties encountered
with direct weighting are similarly resolved. Because swing weights are defined relative
to each other, they must be normalized in order to develop weights that can be
appropriately used in Equation 1. Because of this inherent need to normalize, requiring
that any given random draw sums to one is moot. Similarly, the requirement that the
input distribution be fully sampled is also no longer a factor. Since the specified
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distributions are sampled before creating weights that sum to 1, every part of the input
distribution can always be used, no matter how small or large. Normalization will simply
force the other weights to change to compensate for this. Finally, input integrity is no
longer as important. The numerical weights used in calculations provide only indirect
resemblance to the swing weight coefficients provided by the decision maker. The
distribution of these numerical weights will likewise have little connection (in terms of
distribution form or parameters) to the input distribution.
The commonality between swing weighting and direct weighting is that the form
of the input distributions will impact whether the mean of the final alternative
distributions equal the result of using the most likely case as point estimates. This issue
is not, however, as clear cut as it is with direct weighting. In swing weighting, an input
distribution can be symmetric, but the normalization process calculates weights in a
disproportionate manner.
Standard swing weighting identifies the lowest ranked attribute and holds this as
the baseline. As long as the baseline stays constant, any swing weight coefficient (not
necessarily the lowest) can be used.

3.5 Selecting Alternatives in the Presence of Ambiguity

When Value-Focused Thinking is used to establish single constant values for
alternatives in question, ranking the alternatives is a fairly straightforward matter.
Human judgment and sensitivity analysis can be used to provide insight into alternatives
whose overall values are relatively close. These alternatives can be evaluated further, but
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the results will again be some point estimate of value that can be easily ordered.
Selecting the best alternative is not, however, as simple when the values of the
alternatives are represented by some probability distribution.

3.5.1 Dominance

Dominance has been used when uncertainty in the alternatives’ scores are present
as a means of identifying alternatives that are more desirable than others (Eum et al.,
2001; Lee et al., 2001; Howard, 1966: 100-102; Langweich and Choobineh, 1996).
There are two forms of dominance to consider: deterministic and stochastic. In the
condition where more is preferred, deterministic dominance occurs when the lowest
possible value of an alternative (A) is higher than the highest possible value of another
alternative (B) (Clemen, 1996: 123-127). In this case we say that alternative A
deterministically dominates alternative B. Practically speaking, if a decision maker can
always get a higher value with A, regardless of variation, there is little reason to select B.
The second form of dominance is stochastic dominance (Clemen, 1996: 123-127).
Stochastic dominance can most readily be seen by plotting the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the alternatives (Clemen, 1996: 123-127). If alternative A has an
equal or greater probability than alternative B at every possible value (from 0 to 1), we
say A stochastically dominates B. Figure 9 demonstrates stochastic dominance.
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Figure 9: Stochastic Dominance

In this example, the alternative labeled ESM stochastically dominates the Baseline. The
Baseline starts at a lower overall value and at no point in the cumulative distribution is
more of the baseline at or above a higher overall value.

3.5.2 Statistical Tests

One of the advantages of having an empirical distribution is that it allows for
statistical analysis on the means. For any two given alternatives, a hypothesis test can be
used to determine if there is a significant difference in the means or variances. It may
also be appropriate if the standard error of the mean is “sufficiently large.”
Unfortunately, “sufficiently large” must be judged on a case-by-case basis.
The following hypothesis test can be used for identifying statistical differences in
the means for any two alternatives (Hines and Montgomery, 1990: 312-315). To follow
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n

the previous example: µ D =

∑V
j =1

ESM

− V Baseline

and the resulting hypothesis test would

n

be:
H0 : µD = 0

(4)

H a : µD ≠ 0

This is a paired t-test. Since for any given random draw of weights, two alternatives are
linked by those given weights, a paired t-test is applicable. In the test outlined here, the
null hypothesis, H0, says that the difference in means is zero. In this case, the test is
attempting to discern if the means are equal. The test statistic is:

t0 =

D
SD

n

where D =

∑D
j =1

n
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∑
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⎠
⎣⎝
and S D2 =
n −1
n

n

j

2
j

(5)

where:
D ≡ the overall mean difference
n ≡ the number of replications
S D2 ≡ the sample variance of the differences

In this case, D j = X 1 j − X 2 j , j = 1,K , n , the difference between the alternative values at

any given draw. The null hypothesis is rejected if t0 > tα 2,n −1 or if t0 < −tα 2,n −1 .
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3.6 Methodology Summary

After the decision hierarchy has been built, the weight elicitation method must be
chosen and the simulation model built. Once the model has been built, an appropriate n
must be determined. Following the determination of n, the exact process for simulating
the problem is dependent on the weight elicitation method chosen. If direct weighting is
used, a number of issues are involved that must be considered to maintain consistent and
meaningful interpretation of the weights. There are a number of different techniques to
simulate these direct weights. While the filter method still has shortcomings, this
approach is by far the preferred method. Independent scale weighting and swing
weighting are very similar in that they both resolve many of the issues involved in direct
weighting. They are also similar in their use of normalization to transform decision
maker preferences into weights. In both independent scale weighting and swing
weighting, the information simulated is not the weights, but rather those relative
quantities provided by the decision maker. Figure 10 maps the methodology presented in
this chapter.
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Figure 10: Methodology Flow Chart
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The methodology presented in this chapter follows the flow chart provided in Figure 10.
The steps given are further described as: 1) Identify and structure the objectives and
criteria important to a decision maker for the decision situation at hand. This also
includes identifying any sources of ambiguity. Specifically, identify if there will be any
ambiguity in the weights obtained later in the process. 2) Develop measurement scales
for each of the final end measures. 3) Create Single Dimension Value Functions to
convert raw measurement scores to values. 4) Using the decision structure and possible
sources of ambiguity, determine which weight elicitation method (direct, swing or
independent scale) is most appropriate. 5) Using the weight elicitation method chosen,
obtain relevant weight information from the decision maker. 6) With the information just
obtained, build the input distributions needed to determine weights. 7) Determine the
appropriate number of replications needed. 8) Build the simulation based on the
elicitation method chosen and the distributions available. 9) Score each of the identified
alternatives on the measurement scales and convert them to values. 10) Run the
simulation for the number of replications determined. 11) Identify the empirical
distributions, and their various parameters (e.g. mean and variance), for each alternative
that result from the simulation. 12) Compare alternative distributions through
observation, dominance and statistical tests on parameters. 13) Perform sensitivity
analysis on the form and parameters of the input distributions. Other sensitivity analysis,
as appropriate, can also be conducted. 14) Through the comparisons in step 12 and the
sensitivity analysis in step 13, provide insight to the decision maker on the relative value
of the alternatives and any possible consequence of realistic changes in the decision
structure or inputs.
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This flow chart does not represent a single process, but rather an iterative
approach in which many steps may result in reevaluating some previous step. The
possible iterations and feedback loops have been omitted from the flow chart to eliminate
confusion and highlight the primary flow of the process.
This chapter opened with a discussion of building a simulation model. The three
weight elicitation methods under consideration were then discussed. This discussion
included some of the specific techniques that could be employed to incorporate the
weight distributions into the simulation model. Finally, some possible methods for
evaluating the resulting value distributions were outlined. These ideas lead directly into
Chapter 4 where two simulation examples are presented and their results used to
strengthen the proposed methodology in this thesis.

59

4. Analysis

Chapter 3 introduced a methodology to simulate the effects of weight ambiguity
in a Value-Focused Thinking decision problem. It also provided the ground work for
modeling VFT problems with weight ambiguity. Chapter 2 established the validity of the
Monte Carlo approach and this chapter provides concrete examples of the methodology.
Section 4.1 provides the simulation results of the Airport Siting Problem used by
Lavelle et al. Statistical hypothesis testing is then conducted on the mean and variance of
the empirical distributions to compare them to the first and second moments,
respectively, of the analytical results. Section 4.2 focuses on the results of using weight
ambiguity on a more complex decision problem. Beauregard’s model for Information
Assurance is analyzed using notional distributions in place of constant weights. The
resulting value distributions for each alternative are presented followed by a discussion of
several ways to compare the alternatives to provide insight. The chapter concludes with a
brief summary of the results.

4.1 Airport Citing

The importance of simulating the Airport Siting example from Lavelle et al. is to
provide a link between the analytical results and the simulated results. As is shown in
this section, the simulation results approximate the analytical results very closely. This
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result is used later as a first look at the accuracy of the simulation methodology when
used on more complex decision problem structures.
When possible, it is generally considered better practice to solve a problem
analytically rather than through the use of simulation. Lavelle et al. used a greatly
simplified decision structure to develop an analytical solution to the problem of
parametric uncertainty. As the structure of the problem becomes more complex, these
analytical methods become cumbersome and may even be intractable (Hammersly and
Handscomb, 1964). In these cases, simulation becomes increasingly important.
Simulation can often be employed to provide greater speed and flexibility to the decision
analyst. By simulating the simplified structure used by Lavelle et al., this section
provides a benchmark between the simulated and analytical results, highlighting the
approach while illustrating it with an equivalent outcome.

4.1.1 Building Model

To demonstrate the ability of Monte Carlo Simulation to duplicate the analytical
results from Lavelle et al., the simulation model was constructed as near identical as
possible to the problem structure used in the original study. The following information
was provided as the weight distribution information:
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Table 1: Attribute weight data, from Lavelle et al., 1997: 779

Attribute
1. Cost
2. Capacity
3. Access Time
4. Safety
5. Displacement
6. Noise

Minimum
40.00
30.00
30.00
15.00
28.00
20.00

Mode
-90.00
85.00
-85.00
--

Maximum
60.00
95.00
88.00
80.00
92.00
100.0

Distribution
Uniform
Triangular
Beta
Uniform
Beta
Uniform

The following three tables give the uncertainty data for the ratings of the
alternatives. For each alternative, the uncertainty distribution information for each of the
three attributes is given.

Table 2: Rating data for Alternative A, from Lavelle et al., 1997: 780

Attribute
1. Cost
2. Capacity
3. Access Time
4. Safety
5. Displacement
6. Noise

Minimum
50.00
50.00
50.00
61.00
60.00
30.00

Alternative A
Mode
65.00
68.00
-75.00
75.00
68.00

Maximum
84.00
95.00
78.00
85.00
79.00
89.00

Distribution
Triangular
Beta
Uniform
Beta
Triangular
Beta

Table 3: Rating data for Alternative B, from Lavelle et al., 1997: 780

Attribute
1. Cost
2. Capacity
3. Access Time
4. Safety
5. Displacement
6. Noise

Minimum
62.00
63.00
55.00
65.00
65.00
55.00

Alternative B
Mode
65.00
66.00
-75.00
70.00
65.00
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Maximum
68.00
80.00
70.00
80.00
77.00
70.00

Distribution
Triangular
Beta
Uniform
Beta
Triangular
Beta

Table 4: Rating data for Alternative C, from Lavelle et al., 1997: 780

Attribute
1. Cost
2. Capacity
3. Access Time
4. Safety
5. Displacement
6. Noise

Alternative C
Minimum
Mode
33.00
88.00
25.00
88.00
7.00
-14.00
88.00
30.00
85.00
35.00
84.00

Maximum
95.00
92.00
100.0
89.00
91.00
99.00

Distribution
Triangular
Beta
Uniform
Beta
Triangular
Beta

The information contained in Tables 1-4 was used to construct a Monte Carlo
Simulation model. Table 1 provided the weight distributions. Tables 2-4 provided the
single dimensional values for each of the six attributes. Because Lavelle et al. used
independent scale weighting, each random draw from the distributions provided in Table
1 was normalized to 1. For each attribute the normalized weight was multiplied by the
single dimensional value and the six resulting products were summed to give a final
value. This was done with each of the three alternatives.

4.1.2 Determining n

Following the construction of the simulation model, Equation 3 was used to
determine the number of replication required. To determine the number of replications
using Equation 3, α and β were both chosen as 0.05 with a resulting 5% chance of
making either a Type I or Type II error for any given δ. 0.05 was chosen arbitrarily as a
commonly accepted standard. The Lavelle et al. study scaled all weights and single
dimensional values up two orders of magnitude and the resulting calculations reflect this.
In Equation 3, δ represents the smallest difference in means that can be detected with the
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given power. The smallest difference in means of the alternatives given by the analytical
solution in Lavelle et al. is 1.12. Since this is the known difference from the analytical
solution, choosing δ = 1 would indicate that if the distributions of the alternatives are
compared using the simulation results, the same level of difference among them would be
detectable. The given analytical results also provided a maximum variance in the
alternative scores of 51.41. As was discussed in Chapter 3, this variance can be used as
an estimate for the population variance used to calculate n.

(Z
n=

α

+ Zβ
2

δ2

)σ
2

2

(1.96 + 1.645)
=

2

51.41

1

= 668.1 669

4.1.3 Simulation Results

The following table and figures provide the results from the simulation both
numerically and graphically. Table 5 gives the mean and variance from both the
analytical and empirical distributions for each alternative.
Table 5: Simulating Lavelle

Alternative
A
B
C

Mean
68.32
67.21
69.88

PWE
Variance
9.25
1.34
51.41
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Simulation
Mean
Variance
68.34
10.46
67.22
1.76
69.27
58.17

Overlay Chart
Airport Siting - Alternative A
.030

Normal Distribution
Mean = 68.3391
Std Dev = 3.2346

.022

.015

D
.007

Alternative A

.000
57.5000

62.5000

67.5000

72.5000

77.5000

Figure 11: Alternative A

Figure 11 provides the final distribution of the value of Alternative A. In Figure 11, the
vertical bars come from the numerical results of the simulation and are labeled as
“Alternative A” in the legend. The solid line in the figure is the best fit normal
distribution for the given data. The legend provides the mean and standard deviation of
this best fit curve. This figure, as well as Figures 12 and 13, seems to indicate by
inspection that the simulated and theoretical results are quite close. Exactly how close
will be explored in the following section.
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Overlay Chart
Airport Siting - Alternative A
.033

Normal Distribution
Mean = 67.2245
Std Dev = 1.3283

.025

.016

D
.008

Alternative B

.000
63.0000

65.0000

67.0000

69.0000

71.0000

Figure 12: Alternative B

Figure 12 provides the final distribution of the value of Alternative B. The bars and solid
line are interpreted in the same way as they were in Figure 11, the numerical results and
the best fit curve.

Overlay Chart
Airport Siting - Alternative A
.036

Normal Distribution
Mean = 69.2717
Std Dev = 7.6266

.027

.018

O
.009

Alternative C

.000
45.0000

56.2500

67.5000

78.7500

Figure 13: Alternative C
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90.0000

Figure 13 provides the final distribution of the value of Alternative C. As with Figures
11 and 12, this final chart gives the numeric results as bars and the best fit curve as a
solid line.

4.1.4 Comparing Results

The key to this portion of the research is to demonstrate that the simulated results
closely approximate the analytical results, thereby allowing for a method that does not
require cumbersome integration. The validation of simulation as an approach to weight
ambiguity in the simplified problem structure of PWE also provides a foundation to begin
to simulate more complex problems.
To demonstrate that the simulation results closely approximate the analytical
results, two sets of hypothesis tests were conducted. The first set is designed to compare
the means of the analytical and empirical distributions and the second is designed to test
the variance. Equation 6 provides these tests:

H 0 : µ = µ0

H 0 : σ 2 = σ 02

H a : µ ≠ µ0

H a : σ 2 ≠ σ 02

(6)

where µ0 and σ20 represent the analytical mean and variance respectively and µ and σ2
represent the mean and variance calculated from the empirical distributions.
In the case of the means, the test statistic used is (Hines and Montgomery, 1990:
301):
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Z0 =

X − µ0

σ

n

(7)

where µ0 and X are the analytical mean and empirical mean respectively, σ is the
standard deviation from the analytical solution and n is the number of replications already
determined. In this case, if Z0 falls between -Zα/2 and Zα/2 then we are unable to reject the
null hypothesis that the analytical and empirical means are equal. The same confidence
level, α = 0.01, is being used as it has been previously.
Comparison of the variance will use the test statistic (Hines and Montgomery,
1990: 317):
Z0 =

S −σ0

σ0

2n

(8)

where σ0 and S are the analytical standard deviation and the empirical standard deviation
respectively and n is the number of replications already determined. In this case, if Z0
falls between -Zα/2 and Zα/2 then we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the
analytical and empirical standard deviations, and consequently the variances, are equal.
The same confidence level, α = 0.01, is being used as it has been previously. This test
statistic was chosen as a large-sample test that is robust to errors in the normality
assumption (Hines and Montgomery, 1990: 317-318).
The first test for the mean. For Alternative A:
ZA =

X − µ 0 68.34 − 68.32 0.02
=
=
= 0.17
3.04 25.87
0.118
σ n
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For Alternative B:
X − µ0

ZB =

σ

n

=

67.22 − 67.21 0.01
=
= 0.22
1.16 25.87
0.045

For Alternative C:
ZC =

X − µ 0 69.27 − 69.88 −0.61
=
=
= −2.20
7.17 25.87
0.277
σ n

For all three alternatives, the critical values and rejection regions are the same.
With α = 0.01, the critical values given by -Zα/2 and Zα/2 are –2.58 and 2.58 respectively.
For Alternatives A, B and C, it is clear that the test statistic is within this range and
therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. This indicates that the simulated results
are statistically equivalent to the analytical results.
After the means are compared, the variances are tested. Again, the hypothesis test
and test statistic were both given previously in this section. The results are, for
Alternative A:
ZA =

S −σ0

σ0

2n

=

3.23 − 3.04 0.19
=
= 2.29
3.04 36.58 0.083

=

1.33 − 1.16 0.17
=
= 5.31
1.16 36.58 0.032

For Alternative B:
ZB =

S −σ0

σ0

2n

For Alternative C:
ZB =

S −σ0
7.63 − 7.17 0.46
=
=
= 2.35
σ 0 2n 7.17 36.58 0.196
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The critical values and rejection regions are the same for all three alternatives.
With α = 0.01, the critical values given by -Zα/2 and Zα/2 are –2.58 and 2.58 respectively.
Comparing these critical values to the computed test statistics results in being unable to
reject the null hypothesis that the simulated and theoretical variances are equal for
Alternatives A and C. For Alternative B, the null hypothesis, that the simulated and
theoretical variances are equal, would be rejected. This indicates that for Alternative B,
there is a significant difference in the simulated variance and the theoretical variance.
The purpose of this example was to demonstrate that the results from the
simulation would approximate the results from the analytical solution. Five out of the six
tests performed failed to reject the null hypothesis. That is, for five tests there was not
enough evidence to conclude that the simulated and analytical moments being compared
were different.

4.2 Information Assurance

Simulating Information Assurance provides a look at the results of the proposed
method on a more complex, swing weighted value hierarchy. None of the assumptions
necessary to solve a decision problem with weight ambiguity analytically apply to this
problem. The only thing that has been changed in this problem from the original is in
substituting the constant weights with distributions.
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4.2.1 Building the Model

The previous section has shown that simulating the input parameters to a
weighted additive model provides results equivalent to the analytical solution. While this
may not be necessary when simple problem structures such as PWE are used, the
situation changes considerably when complex decision structures are modeled. In these
cases, the analytical solution can quickly become time consuming and difficult, if not
intractable.
A hierarchically structured VFT problem using swing weighting is just such a
case. Not only do these structures potentially contain the distributions used by Lavelle et
al., they may also be specified empirically or through some mixed distribution. The

hierarchical nature of the VFT methodology would now cause the final weights to be not
simply normalized, but also a product of several local weights.
The decision hierarchy used in Figure 2 forms the basis of a more complex
decision structure which now incorporates weight ambiguity. One possible source of
ambiguity in this decision problem is designing a hierarchy that can be used not only in
the organization it was built for, but to model Information Assurance problems for other
organizations. In such a case, the preference tradeoffs of several decision makers need to
be taken into account. Figure 14 contains the information from Figure 2, but also
includes the corresponding distribution for each of the swing weight coefficients. In each
case, the original provided swing weight coefficient will represent the most likely value
for each distribution. This may be different from the expected value of the distribution.
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Information Assurance
(IA)

Information and IS Protection
4/7 (0.571)
~ triang(2,4,6)

Detection
2/7 (0.286)
~ triang(1,2,3)

Availability
1/9 (0.064)
x
Confidentiality
4/9 (0.254)
~ triang(2,4,6)
Integrity
3/9 (0.191)
triang(1.5,3,4.5)
Compliance
1/9 (0.064)
triang(0.5,1,1.5)

Reaction
1/7 (0.143)
x

Timely
10/27 (0.106)
~ triang(2.5,5,7.5)

Physical
Internal
1/35 (0.003)
x

Electronic
Internal
10/35 (0.030)
~ triang(5,10,15)

Respond
6/10 (0.086)
~ triang(3,6,9)

Physical
External
4/35 (0.012)
~ triang(2,4,6)

Accountability
15/27 (0.159)
~ triang(3.75,7.5,11.25)

Electronic
External
20/35 (0.061)
~ triang(10,20,30)

Timely
20/27 (0.064)
~ triang(5,10,15)

Flexible
Deterrence
2/27 (0.006)
x

Verify
5/27 (0.016)
~ triang(1.25,2.5
,3.75)

Restore
3/10 (0.043)
~ triang(1.5,3,4.5)

Ability to
Ability Accurately
Detect Event Categorize Event
5/6 (0.132)
1/6 (0.027)
~ triang(2.5,5,7.5)
x
Flexibility
2/27 (0.021)
x

Timely
1/4 (0.011)
x

Accurately
3/4 (0.032)
~ triang(1.5,3,4.5)

Adapt/Learn
1/10 (0.014)
x

Figure 14: IA Hierarchy with Swing Weight Coefficient Distributions

With no clear guidance from the original study on how to structure the weight
distributions, it was decided to simply provide all weights with a triangular distribution
with the original swing weight coefficient as the mode, half this value for the min and
one and a half times this value for the max. This created all symmetrical distributions.
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There is one case that should be noted. Under Information and IS Protection, two
attributes were deemed to have equal weight and also be the least important. One of
them was arbitrarily chosen to remain equal to x, thereby representing the least important
attribute. The other was distributed ~ triang(0.5,1,1.5).
As described in Chapter 2, swing weights are developed by identifying the least
important attribute and using it as the baseline, x. Each successive attribute in the given
tier and branch is then compared to this attribute and its swing weight coefficient is equal
to its relative importance above the baseline. Since all swing weight coefficients and
corresponding local weights are identified against the value of the baseline, this value
must not change. As shown in Figure 14, the coefficient of the swing weight distribution
for the least important attribute is fixed at 1. However, since the weights are normalized
after each random draw, the actual distribution of the corresponding numerical weight
will not be a constant.

4.2.2 Determining n

As was done for the Lavelle et al. study, n must be determined for this simulation.
The number of replications was again calculated from the desired Type I error, Type II
error and detectable difference. Equation 3 was again used. In this case, the hypothesis
test was conducted on the distributions of the final values of the alternatives. Without
any prior knowledge of the final alternative distributions, the population variances are not
known. However, there is information available that can help provide an estimate. As
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was described in Chapter 3, the population variance can be estimated by using the
variance of the single dimensional values for the final end measures for each attribute.
For the sample size calculations for this example, α = β = 0.05. This provides a
typical 95% confidence, and a power of 0.95 for any given δ. The choice of δ is based on
a desire to be able to detect a certain difference. In this case, it is desirable to detect a
minimum difference of 0.01. The largest variance in the component utilities of the
alternatives is used as an approximation of the variance. In the Information Assurance
example, the largest variance is 0.0039. This is the variance used to calculate n.

(Z
n=

α

2

+ Zβ

δ

2

)σ
2

2

(1.96 + 1.645)
=

2

0.0039

2

0.01

=

0.05
= 500
0.012

4.2.3 Simulation Results

Table 6 provides a summary of parameters associated with the empirical
distributions for the final value of the alternatives. For reference it also includes the
original value of each alternative.

Table 6: Information Assurance Simulation Results

Statistic
Original Value
Mean
Variance
Range Min
Range Max

Baseline
0.6180
0.6190
0.0001
0.5876
0.6519

Alternatives
ISS
ESM
0.7530
0.6830
0.7532
0.6824
0.0001
0.0002
0.7228
0.6463
0.7758
0.7244
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Cisco
0.9100
0.9095
0.0001
0.8736
0.9302

The results in Table 6 clearly show that the distribution mean is very close to the
point estimate mean and that the variances are quite low. While this table provides much
useful information, it does not give an intuitive look at the distributions of the
alternatives. Figures 15-18 provide this intuitive look.

Overlay Chart
IA - Baseline
.032
Normal Distribution
Mean = 0.619037
Std Dev = 0.011229

.024

.016
D

.008

Baseline

.000
0.580000

0.597500

0.615000

0.632500

0.650000

Figure 15: IA – Baseline

Figure 15 gives the distribution of the final value of the Baseline system. The chart
includes vertical bars representing the exact numerical results from the simulation. The
solid line is the best fit normal approximation to the data. The legend provides the mean
and standard deviation for this best fit line.
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Overlay Chart
IA - ISS
.032
Normal Distribution
Mean = 0.753240
Std Dev = 0.008944

.024

.016
O

.008

ISS

.000
0.725000

0.738750

0.752500

0.766250

0.780000

Figure 16: IA – ISS

Figure 16 provides the numerical results from simulating the value of the ISS alternative.
Again, a best fit normal approximation is provided along with the mean and standard
deviation.

Overlay Chart
IA - ESM
.034
Normal Distribution
Mean = 0.682405
Std Dev = 0.013452

.026

.017

.009

ESM

.000
0.640000

0.660000

0.680000

0.700000

0.720000

Figure 17: IA – ESM

Figure 17 give the final distribution of value for the ESM Information Assurance
alternative. This chart includes the numerical results of the simulation as a series of

76

vertical bars with a best fit approximation of the normal as a solid line. The mean and
standard deviation of the normal is given in the legend.

Overlay Chart
IA - Cisco
.036
Normal Distribution
Mean = 0.909493
Std Dev = 0.009191

.027

n
.a
o

.018

.009

Cisco

.000
0.885000

0.897500

0.910000

0.922500

0.935000

Figure 18: IA – Cisco

Figure 18 gives the same information as the previous three figures for the Cisco
alternative. Again, the mean and standard deviation of the normal approximation is given
in the legend.
Figures 15-18 show the empirical distribution and fitted normal distribution for
each of the alternative. Figure 19, however, truly provides an idea of how the alternatives
compare.
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Overlay Chart
Frequency Comparison
.195
Baseline
.146
ESM
.098

£

ISS
.049
Cisco
.000
0.5500

0.6500

0.7500

0.8500

0.9500

Figure 19: Information Assurance Alternatives

It is clear from Figure 19 that the inclusion of ambiguity in this model, assuming
that the ambiguity was properly specified, does not change how this decision would have
been made. This figure also indicates that Cisco is by and far the best alternative. For
this decision problem, part of the insight provided to the decision maker is that within the
specified probable weights, there is not set of weights in which any alternative out
performs Cisco. This information is useful in determining that the Cisco alternative is
clearly a better alternative

4.2.4 Dominance

Once the simulation has been built and run, the results can begin to be analyzed.
The obvious first method is to simply look at the distributions of the alternatives when
plotted together, as shown in Figure 19. This may clearly rule out some alternatives or
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separate the alternatives into distinct groups. After that, however, the comparison
becomes more difficult.
The first level of analysis is to check for dominance among the alternatives as was
discussed in Chapter 3. One alternative (A) deterministically dominates another
alternative (B) if the lowest possible value of A is higher than the highest possible value
of B. Finding dominance among the alternatives allows the decision maker to draw
strong conclusions about which alternative is better.
For the Information Assurance example, dominance can easily be determined
from Table 6 by looking at the min and max range values. By comparing these values,
Cisco clearly dominates all other alternatives. In addition, ISS dominates the Baseline
system. There is no deterministic dominance between ESM and both the Baseline and
ISS. Stochastic dominance, however, exists between any two alternatives available. In
these cases, it is clear that Cisco displays deterministic dominance over all others. ISS
dominates both the Baseline and ESM and finally, ESM dominates the Baseline. These
results come as no surprise given the original result. Figure 20 illustrates the presence of
stochastic dominance among the four alternatives.
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Overlay Chart
Cumulative Comparison
1.000
Baseline
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ESM
.500

s
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ISS
.250
Cisco
.000
0.5500

0.6500

0.7500

0.8500

0.9500

Figure 20: Cumulative distribution chart showing stochastic dominance

Figure 20 clearly shows the stochastic dominance present among the four alternatives.
This clearly indicates that the Cisco alternative would be preferred.
Chapter 4 presented two examples used to demonstrate the proposed
methodology. The first example, Airport Citing, demonstrated the connection between
analytical and simulated results. It provided a strong indication that the proposed
methods of simulation accurately model the reality of using probability distributions to
represent weight ambiguity in a decision problem. The second example, Information
Assurance, illustrated the usefulness of simulation when incorporating weight ambiguity
into larger, more complex decision structures. It also provided a venue for briefly
discussing possible comparison methods for resulting distributions of value for the
alternatives. Together, the examples demonstrate the validity and applicability of
simulation.
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5. Conclusions and Discussion

With the inclusion of weight ambiguity into the VFT methodology, the decision
analyst is able to bring a more flexible and robust process to the decision maker. “[I]t
creates a paradigm for a priori sensitivity analysis, thereby giving the decision maker
more information upon which to base decisions…” (Lavelle et al., 1997: 774). Although
the presence of weight ambiguity has been a long established fact, most decision analysis
methodologies simply assumed it away. The methodology presented here, and
demonstrated by the examples, makes that assumption no longer necessary.

5.1 A New Approach

The technique presented here is an adaptation and generalization of Keeney’s
VFT process. It has been expanded to identify and include potential ambiguity in the
weights. While the idea that a decision maker’s weights may not be absolute is not new
and despite the increasing prevalence of groups in the decision making process, there has
been very little research into expanding current methods to account for preference
ambiguity.
A new approach utilizing Monte Carlo simulation is clearly suggested. The
methodology proposed here begins to fill that void. Comparison with the analytical
results from Lavelle et al. indicate a very close congruity between the theoretical and
simulated results. Given the current state of computing power, a simulation approach
offers a greater degree of flexibility to the decision analyst. Once the simulation model
has been built, modifying the model for “what if” analysis and sensitivity analysis takes
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little time. Furthermore, this procedure is both robust enough to handle decision
problems of varying complexity and does so in a manner easy to duplicate so it may be
put into practical application, provided the required distributions can be elicited.

5.2 Results

The hypothesis tests resulting from Airport Siting example suggest the
applicability of Monte Carlo simulation. Five of the six tests showed no statistical
difference between the analytical solution and the simulated results. The statistical
results and the accompanying figures clearly, although not perfectly, demonstrate that
simulation can closely approximate an analytical solution.
The Information Assurance decision problem was represented by a complex and
multi-tiered structure. This was also successfully simulated. While the results did not
lend themselves to a more descriptive assessment of the different alternative selection
options, they showed that distributions can be developed. Even this lack of alternative
overlap is insightful. The lack of substantial overlap illustrated both deterministic and
stochastic dominance. Identifying the presence of dominance in a decision problem is
also insightful. This may help identify the clearly preferred alternative even if the
decision maker’s preference structure varies widely.
The direct weighting discussion and examples shed particular light on the
potential shortcomings of direct weighting when applied to weight ambiguity. The
fundamental problem arises from using independent random variable to model a
dependent reality. The issues themselves demonstrate that the idea of using ambiguity in
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weights must be closely scrutinized to assure that the information obtained from the
decision maker is not inconsistent.

5.3 Future Work

One of the largest areas for future research is in the area of sensitivity analysis.
Since this method directly incorporates changes in weights, is there any need for
traditional sensitivity analysis? Are there possibly other types of sensitivity analysis that
may be useful? Sensitivity analysis for constant weights centers around varying those
weights to determine how robust the decision is to changes. With distributions, it may
now be necessary to look at sensitivity analysis in terms of varying the distribution of the
weights. The impact on the decision when certain weights are given more or less
variance may be used. In addition, traditional sensitivity analysis using constant weights
may still be effective if the weight distributions have been incorrectly elicited. There
may be ways to incorporate a more deliberate and insightful sensitivity analysis.
Additional methods of comparing and assessing the final alternative distributions may
open up avenues to more insight into the decisions. Research into the best methods for
eliciting weight distributions should be developed. Finally, the model needs to be applied
in a number of settings to discover its strengths and try to bring to light any flaws. More
work can also be done in the testing of more input distributions to the model. The most
significant advances to this research would be in the fields of probability elicitation from
decision makers and the comparison of alternatives.
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